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A UTHOR : 


STEARNS,  FRANK 


TITLE: 


SPACE  AND  TIME 


PLACE: 


WYORK 


DA  TE : 

[19-?] 


COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY  LIBRARIES 
PRESERVATION  DEPARTMENT 

BIBLIOGRAPHIC  MICROFORM  TARHFT 


Master  Negative  # 


Original  Material  as  Filmed  -  Existing  Bibliographic  Record 


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Stearns,  Prank  Preston   1846- 


Space  and  time,  a  critique  on  Herbert  Spencer 
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A  Critique  on   Herbert  Spencer 


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Space  and  Time 


A  Critique  on   Herbert  Spencer 


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HERBERT  SPENCER 


ON 


SPACE  AND  TIME 


< 


Herbert  Spencer  has  developed  his  theory  of 
space  and  time  in  some  forty  printed  pages  without 
coming  to  any  very  definite  conclusion  that  I  can 
discover,  except  that  we  derive  our  notions  of  them 
from  experience,  and  that  they  are  not,  as  Kant  and 
Hamilton  supposed,  a  priori  cognitions  or  forms  of 
thought.  His  statement  has  throughout  the  char- 
acter of  an  argument  rather  than  of  an  investigation; 
and  Spencer  would  seem  to  have  changed  his  opinion 
during  the  course  of  this,  for  on  the  third  page  of  his 
chapter  on  space  he  says: 

"  If  Space  be  an  universal  form  of  the  non  ego,  it  must 
produce  some  corresponding  universal  form  in  the  ego— 
a  form  which,  as  being  the  constant  element  of  all  im- 
pressions presented  in  experience,  and  therefore  of  all 
impressions  represented  in  thought,  is  independent  of 
evQxy  particular  impression  "  ; 

and  again  on  page  233 : 

"  With  such  further  reasons  for  holding  that  space  is 
not  a  form  of  the  non  ego  disclosed  to  us  by  experience, 

3 


119827 


4  SPACE  AND    TIME, 

we  may  be  encouraged  to  continue  that  analysis  of  our 
perception  of  it  collaterally  entered  upon  in  the  last 
chapter." 

This  appears  very  much  like  a  contradiction  in 
terms,  if  not  in  fact.  In  the  revised  edition  of  his 
Psychology  —  now  a  rare  book  —  he  speaks  of  space 
as  an  "  objective  reality,"  and  also  as  "  an  ability 
to  contain  bodies."  He  distinguishes  between  oc- 
cupied and  unoccupied  space.  He  thinks  time  may 
be  converted  into  space. 

In  regard  to  unoccupied  space  it  may  as  well  be 
said  at  once  that  we  know  nothing  of  it  objectively. 
So  far  as  the  Milky-Way  matter  extends,  and,  who 
can  tell  what  is  beyond  the  universe  ?  We  do  not 
even  know  what  is  beyond  our  atmosphere. 

Experience  may  be  either  subjective  or  objective. 
Hunger  is  a  subjective  experience;  cold  an  objec- 
tive one.  Life  itself  is  an  experience  and  yet  life 
precedes  all  experience.  Investigation  of  our  men- 
tal faculties  is  an  experience,  and  yet  it  is  with 
these  faculties  that  we  make  the  investigation. 
Spencer  evidently  thinks  that  our  experience  of 
space  and  time  is  objective. 

WHAT   IS   SPACE  ? 

Following  Shakespeare's  suggestion  that  with  a 
bait  of  error  one  may  catch  a  carp  of  truth,  and 
without  carping  at  Mr,  Spencer,  who  frequently 
uses  this  method  himself,  we  may,  perhaps,  learn 
something  of  the  true  character  or  quality  of  space, 
by  considering  what  is  included  in  this  dictum. 


A    CRITIQUE   ON  HERBERT  SPENCER, 


s 


'4 


< 


An  objective  reality  has  been  frequently  defined 
as  an  entity  which  is  cognizable  by  the  senses;  and 
if  this  were  not  so,  it  is  quite  impossible  to  imagine 
how  we  should  have  experience  of  it, — how  we  could 
become  conscious  of  it.  Now  which  of  the  senses 
brings  us  into  relation  with  the  objective  reality 
called  space  ?  We  certainly  do  not  smell  space ; 
neither  do  we  taste  it,  nor  hear  it.  The  question 
remains  whether  we  can  feel  it  or  see  it.  In  order 
to  feel  an  object,  however,  it  must  have  consist- 
ency, or  weight;  in  order  to  see  an  object  it  must 
have  color.  This  is  a  proposition  which  there  is  no 
disputing.  Now  has  any  physicist  ever  succeeded 
in  weighing  space;  has  any  artist  succeeded  in 
painting  a  reproduction  of  it  ?  But  the  Spencerian 
replies  that  if  we  cannot  see  space  we  can  see  into 
it  and  through  it ;  if  we  cannot  feel  space,  as  we  do 
a  brick  wall,  we  can  feel  the  spaces  on  the  wall 
marked  by  the  bricks  with  our  eyes  shut,  and  thus 
obtain  an  idea  of  the  division  of  space ;  that  it  is  by 
noting  the  relations  of  the  different  objects  which 
we  see,  near  and  far,  that  we  obtain  a  conception 
of  universal  space. 

Metaphysics  is  a  science  of  delicate  perceptions 
and  a  strict  definition  of  terms.  What  is  custo- 
marily meant  by  looking  into  space,  is  looking  at 
the  sky,  and  the  sky  is  an  optical  illusion.  If  the 
atmosphere  had  no  color  we  should  see  nothing 
there  except  the  clouds.  It  is  true  that  we  can 
look  through  a  glass,  and  that  glass  is  an  objective 
reality;  but  we  cannot  at  the  same  time  look 
through  an  object  and  be  conscious  of  its  existence, 


\ 


6  SPACE  AND    TIME, 

unless  we  also  see  it.  Unless  we  perceive  that  glass 
is  glass,  we  are  liable  to  knock  our  heads  against  it, 
as  birds  do  in  a  conservatory.  We  commonly  per- 
ceive reflections  on  the  glass,  or  the  green  color  at 
its  edges,  which  prevent  our  doing  this;  but  there 
are  no  reflections  or  coloring  which  assist  us  to  de- 
termine the  objectivity  of  space.  These  are  pro- 
verbial expressions  which  cannot  prudently  be  used 
as  the  terms  of  a  syllogism  in  philosophy.  The 
same  is  true  of  measuring  spaces,  on  a  wall,  or 
clock,  or  any  flat  surface.  What  is  meant  properly 
in  this  case  is  distance,  and  not  space  in  the  ab- 
stract. Now  distance  is  linear,  but  space  extends 
in  every  direction;  it  might  be  called  an  abstract 
universal  polygon.  Marking  distances  on  a  plane 
surface  will  assist  us  to  obtain  a  conception  of  num- 
ber, but  not  a  conception  of  space.  Shall  we  not 
conclude,  therefore,  that  space  is  not  an  objective 
reality,  as  air  and  water  are  objective  realities  ? 

Herbert  Spencer  would  seem  to  have  been  half 
conscious  of  this,  for  we  soon  afterwards  find  him 
defining  space  as  "  an  ability. to  contain  bodies." 

Ability,  however,  is  a  force, —  light  is  an  ability 
of  combustion,  and  electricity  is  an  ability, —  and  a 
necessity  of  all  forces  is  that  they  should  be  present 
in  one  place  and  absent  in  another;  whereas  space 
is,  as  above  mentioned,  present  everywhere,  and 
always  in  an  equal  degree.  No  writer  has  ever 
contended  that  space  was  a  force,  physical  or  mental. 

Herbert  Spencer,  indeed,  begins  with  the  assump- 
tion that  there  is  occupied  space  and  unoccupied 
space, —  that  is,  bodies  and  vacua  ;  but  he  soon  loses 


> 


A    CRITIQUE   ON  HERBERT  SPENCER.  j 

sight  of  this  distinction,  and  writes  as  if  space  and 
the  atmosphere  were  synonymous  terms.     This  is 
the  common  materialistic  mistake  in  considering  the 
subject.      There    is    space    for    human    beings   in 
the  atmosphere,  because  it  is  our  element;  but  the 
atmosphere  is  a  body  as  well  as  the  earth,  and  if 
space  is  likewise  an  objective  reality  it  is  difficult  to 
understand  how  the  two  can  coexist  in  the  same 
place.     A  metal  bar  charged  with  electricity  might 
seem  an  exception  to  this,  but  all  metals  are  more 
or  less  porous,  and  even  the  densest  can  be  pene- 
trated  by  the  electric  fluid  just  as  granite  absorbs 
water.     The  attempt  to  materialize  space,  like  the 
materialization  of  spirits,   must  always  result  in  a 
contradiction  of  this  sort.      If  there  is  space  in  one 
body  there  must  be  in  another,  even  if  the  first  is 
a  gas  and  the  second  a  solid.     If  there  is  space  in 
the  atmosphere  there  must  also  be  space  in  the  earth, 
and    space   in  a  cannon-ball.      Now  a  cannon-ball 
may  be  galvanized,  but  another  objective  reality  can 
coexist  in  it  only  after  a  hole  has  been  bored  in  the 
metal.     This  would  seem  to  reduce  the  objective 
reality  of  space    to    an    absurdity.     On    the   other 
hand,  if  space  only  exists  in  a  vacuum,  it  may  fairly 
be  contended    that  we  neither  know  nor   can    we 
learn  anything  about  it.     Some  astronomers  believe 
that  there  is  no  such  thing  as  an  absolute  vacuum, 
but  that  the  universe  is  filled  with  gases  in  a  finely 
attenuated  condition. 

The  truth  would  seem  to  be  that  space  and  time 
are  mental  forms  of  measurement,  and  have  no  ob- 
jective reality  whatever.     The  subject  goes  back  to 


V 


s 


SPACE  AND    TIME, 


A   CRITIQUE  ON  HERBERT  SPENCER, 


Plato's  forms,  which  really  lie  at  the  base  of  all 
metaphysical  inquiry.  Everything  created  by  man 
is  composed  of  two  distinct  elements, — an  objective 
material  and  a  subjective  or  intellectual  form.  Thus 
a  yardstick  is  an  objective  reality,  but  it  contains  a 
subjective  element,  the  yard,  which  taken  by  itself 
has  only  a  subjective  existence.  This  becomes 
more  apparent  when  we  consider  a  mile,  a  degree, 
or  any  larger  form  of  measurement,  which  never  re- 
ceives a  concrete  form.  It  is  the  same  with  all  other 
methods  of  measuring  distance  or  extension  ;  and 
space,  which  might  be  defined  as  universal  exten- 
sion, is  the  most  abstract  conception  of  this  class, 
and  is  the  most  purely  and  absolutely  mental.  All 
universal  conceptions,  like  all  generalizations,  are 
mental  and  subjective;  for  in  external  nature  we 
only  meet  with  individual  and  particular  objects, 
which  the  mind  classifies  by  a  mental  method.  The 
word  universe  itself  is  used  as  an  intellectual 
abstraction. 

Considered  relatively  there  is  space  for  a  man  in 
the  atmosphere,  for  a  fish  in  water,  for  a  borer  in 
wood,  and  for  angle  worms  in  the  earth. 

What  is  commonly  intended  by  space,  is  either 
room  to  breathe,  live,  and  move  in,  or  the  prospect 
subtended  by  the  angle  of  vision;  and  there  is  a 
significant  relation  between  these  two  meanings. 
That  our  notion  of  space  is  called  into  activity  by 
the  external  world  cannot  be  doubted,  but  like 
genius  it  must  be  in  us  before  it  ever  could  come 
out.  The  same  may  be  said  of  language.  Even  an 
unlimited  series  of  external  impressions  could  never 


> 


have  brought  the  language  of  the  human  race  into 
existence,  unless  we  had  already  been  endowed  with 
the  faculty  for  it.  A  scientific  investigation  in 
either  case  would  have  little  value,  since  we  are  too 
remote  from  the  period  in  which  we  acquire  our  first 
perceptions  of  space  and  time  to  obtain  accurate 
data  concerning  them.  We  can  only  reason  about 
them,  as  we  reason  concerning  the  constitution  of 
the  sun  and  the  planets.  This  much,  however,  is 
certain,  that  the  infant  child  becomes  conscious  of 
space  as  soon  as  he  opens  his  eyes,  just  as  he  be- 
comes conscious  of  an  external  world  by  the  sense 
of  touch.  The  knowledge  is  immediate  and  con- 
tinuous, for  doubt  is  an  intellectual  process  which 
can  only  arise  at  a  later  stage  of  his  growth.  In 
order  to  doubt  we  must  have  experience  of  error. 
It  certainly  seems  as  if  a  child  must  realize  separa- 
tion at  the  first  sight,  and  even  if  the  object  before 
him  is  but  a  few  feet  away  he  must  be  conscious  that 
it  does  not  touch  him,  as  those  things  do  which  he 
feels  with  his  hands  and  body.  At  all  events  he 
learns  this  very  quickly,  and  does  not  require 
repeated  experiments,  like  a  natural  philosopher,  to 
become  convinced  of  it.  , 

This  visual  angle  is  what  we  customarily  mean 
when  we  speak  of  space.  If  we  go  into  a  dark  room 
where  our  eyesight  no  longer  avails  and  we  are 
obliged  to  feel  our  way,  we  still  have  the  recollection 
of  space  to  prevent  our  losing  the  sense  of  it;  and 
not  alone  that,  but  the  fact  that  only  our  hands  and 
feet  are  in  contact  with  external  objects— for  we  do 
not  feel  the  atmosphere — shows  us  that  there  must 


10 


SPACE  AND    TIME. 


t 


be  space  around  us,  without  the  assistance  of  eye- 
sight. Indeed,  the  sense  of  space,  having  once 
originated,  never  can  leave  the  human  mind  unless 
we  are  being  drowned,  or  smothered  in  some  other 
manner,  when  we  return  to  the  antecedent  condf- 
tion  of  the  child  before  his  eyes  are  opened,  and  the 
two  different  meanings  in  which  space  is  accepted 
become  reconciled.'  It  is  probable  that  persons 
born  blind  also  acquire  a  sense  of  space  through 
unimpeded  motion. 

Space  can  only  exist  by  division  into  spaces,  and 
these  divisions  are  of  human  invention.  Infinite 
space  would  be  simply  nothing.  It  is  impossible  to 
conceive  that  space  has  a  limit  or  that  it  is  without 
a  limit;  for  as  it  exists  only  in  thought  its  limita- 
tions can  only  be  those  which  are  imposed  by  the 
individual  at  any  particular  time.  What  there  may 
be  beyond  the  range  of  human  observation  in  the 
external  world  we  cannot  know,  and  it  is  quite  use- 
less to  speculate.  An  infinity  of  thought  is  one 
thing,  but  an  infinity  of  matter  is  another,  and  the 
human  mind  shrinks  from  the  contemplation  of  it. 

Space  might  be  described  as  an  imaginary  sphere 
with  an  infinite  radius;  but  this  infinity  is  subjective 
and  not  objective.  An  objective  infinity  would  in 
this  case  result  in  the  subordination  of  mind  to 
matter  and  the  extinction  of  organic  life.     Dr.  C. 

'  De  Quincey's  testimony  in  regard  to  space  and  time  under  ab- 
normal conditions,  is  worth  nothing,  for  he  is  hardly  a  trustworthy 
witness.  His  description  of  a  night  under  the  influence  of  opium,  in 
which  he  seemed  to  live  seventy  years,  and  beheld  a  sea  of  human 
faces,  is  a  plagiarism,  perhaps  unconscious,  from  Shakespeare's 
Richard  III.,  where  it  will  be  found  in  the  prison  scene  of  Clarence. 


A    CRITIQUE   ON  HERBERT  SPENCER, 


II 


\ 


I 


> 


C.  Everett  says:  "  Space  is  simply  the  possibility 
of  infinite  extension,  or,  what  is  the  same  thing,  the 
infinite  possibility  of  extension.  Space  is  in  itself 
nothing.  If  you  imagine  an  object  struck  out  of 
existence,  and  nothing  to  take  its  place,  that  nothing 
would  be  called  space."'  Space  as  an  objective 
reality  would  be  a  materialized  chimaera. 

WHAT  IS  TIME  ? 

As  Space  has  been  defined  as  infinite  extension,  so 
time  may  be  termed  infinite  intension.  It  is  the 
form  of  measurement  which  we  adopt  for  our  inter- 
nal life.  Space  is  not  an  objective  reality,  but  it 
has  an  objective  application,  whereas  the  application 
of  time  is  originally  subjective.  I  do  not  think, 
however,  that  the  sense  of  time  results  from  the 
sequence  of  our  intellectual  operations,  but  rather 
from  the  repetition  of  the  same  idea  or  necessary 
consideration.'  So  long  as  man  lives  in  a  purely 
animal  condition,  one  day  is  like  another,  and  there 
is  no  occasion  for  counting  them ;  but  as  soon  as  he 
seeks  to  improve  his  mode  of  life,  the  necessity  of 
time  arises  so  that  he  may  regulate  his  life  by  it. 
The  sun  and  moon  do  not  mark  time  for  us,  but  we 
make  use  of  them  as  measures  of  time.  That  this 
is  the  case  is  evident  from  the  fact  that  we  correct 
the  slight  aberrations  of  the  sun  and  moon,  in  order 
to  obtain  mathematically  perfect  divisions  of  time. 
There  is  always  this  close  relation  between  the  sub- 
jective and  the  objective  in  practical  affairs,  for  man 

'  Everett's  Science  of  Thought. 

'  As,  for  instance,  the  necessity  of  obtaining  food  at  regular  intervals. 


12 


SPACE  AND    TIME, 


is  continually  obliged  to  adapt  his  life  to  external 
changes  over  which  he  has  no  control;  and  it  is 
this  which  has  so  often  deceived  philosophers  in 
regard  to  the  true  source  of  his  mental  cognitions; 
but  it  should  be  remembered  that  if  the  long  periods 
of  time  are  derived  from  the  revolutions  of  the 
earth,  its  smaller  divisions  into  hours,  minutes,  and 
seconds  are  purely  arbitrary. 

It  is  a  popular  mistake  to  suppose  that  time  ex- 
tends to  eternity.  If  time  were  to  cease,  eternity 
would  begin;  but  in  such  case  time  would  be 
limited,  would  not  extend  to  infinity.  Eternity  is 
really  the  antipodes  of  time,  or,  as  John  Weiss  said, 
**  Eternity  is  now,'' — a  perpetual  now.  Time  may 
therefore  be  described  by  an  imaginary  line  extend- 
ing from  the  eternal  to  the  infinite. 

The  first  cognition  of  a  new-born  child  is  that  of 
life,  which  comes  with  his  first  scream.  The  next 
is  objectivity  —  what  Professor  James  calls  "  other- 
ness." The  child's  third  cognition  must  be  that  of 
objective  self,  derived  from  the  sense  of  hunger;  and 
its  fourth  that  of  space,  from  sight  or  the  free  move- 
ments of  its  limbs;  and  its  sense  of  time  is  probably 
derived  from  the  repeated  sensations  of  hunger. 
These  experiences  are,  however,  purely  subjective. 

Time  and  space  are  brought  into  relation  with 
one  another  through  motion.  Of  space  considered 
in  the  abstract,  there  can  be  no  motion,  but  motion 
produces  a  sense  of  distance  which  is  one  of  the 
attributes  of  space,  and  lapse  of  time  produces  a 
sense  of  motion.  It  is  thus  that  distances,  mis- 
called spaces,  serve  to  represent  the  lapse  of  time  on 


t 


> 


A    CRITIQUE   ON  HERBERT  SPENCER. 


13 


a  clock;  but  even  the  face  of  a  clock  could  not 
properly  be  called  a  space,  for,  as  before  stated, 
space  extends  in  every  direction.  By  no  effort  of 
the  imagination  can  space  be  reduced  to  a  single 
line,  straight  or  curved,  and  therefore  all  attempts 
to  convert  time  into  space  will  invariably  end  in  a 
confusion  of  language.  Intension  cannot  be  con- 
verted into  extension.  We  speak  of  a  day's  journey 
to  indicate  the  time  we  have  spent  in  travelling,  but 
the  earth's  surface  is  never  measured  in  that  manner. 
So  also  in  Switzerland,  traveling  is  estimated  by 
hours,  because  the  country  is  so  uneven  that  a  state- 
ment in  miles  would  afford  no  adequate  impression 
of  the  journey.  Time  is  measured  by  distances,  but 
no  railroad  train  is  sufficiently  accurate  to  measure 
distance  by  time.  Only  the  revolutions  of  the  earth 
and  planets — no  human  invention — can  be  made  to 
serve  that  purpose. 

It  is  impossible  to  conceive  of  time  as  extending 
like  space  in  every  direction.  It  extends  backward 
to  infinity  and  forward  to  infinity, — or  rather  from 
the  inconceivable  to  the  inconceivable.  It  might 
be  symbolized  by  a  straight  line  with  -  at  either 
end.  This  is  a  grand  idea,  for  it  affords  an  intima- 
tion of  a  higher  intelligence  than  we  mortals  possess, 
to  which  such  a  fact  can  be  plainly  perceptible. 

As  Kuno  Fischer  observes,  the  whole  science  of 
mathematics  is  founded  on  space  and  time.*  Space 
gives  us  addition  and  subtraction;  time,  multiplica- 
tion and  division.  Multiplication  results  from  the 
repetition  of  the  same  spatial  quantity,  and,  as  has 

'  Fischer  on  Kant 's  JCritiky  p.  49. 


I 


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14 


SPACE  AND   TIME. 


already  been  stated,  it  is  this  repetition  of  a  mental 
cognition  which  gives  us  the  sense  of  time.  If  the 
spaces  are  unequal,  time  cannot  affect  them  ex- 
cept by  obtaining  a  new  form  of  measurement. 
Multiplication  equals  time  plus  addition.  Now  a 
pure  mathematics  is  an  a  priori  science,  an  emana- 
tion of  the  intellect  which  has  no  objective  reality. 
Numbers  are  abstract  types. 

There  are  no  grand  ideas  in  Herbert  Spencer's 
psychology;  as  there  never  can  be  in  a  materialistic 
philosophy.     It   is  true  that  he    realizes  that   the 
quality   of   space   and  time   has   some   peculiarity 
which  it  is  not  easy  to  explain  on  the  principles  he 
has  adopted.     He  says  (page  25):  "  Exception  may 
be  taken  to  this  argument  on  several  grounds  —  on 
the  ground  that  space  and  time,  taken  in  the  abstract, 
are  not  strictly  conceivable  things  in  the  sense  that 
other  things  are."     Here  he  evidently  has  obtained 
an  intimation  of  the  truth,  but  he  closes  his  mind 
to  it  in    order   to   hold    fast    to    his    preconceived 
opinions  of  mental  evolution.     Time  and  space  are 
subjective  realities,  or  they  could  not  be  conceived 
in  the  abstract.     It  is  impossible  to  conceive   the 
sun,  a  tree,  a  lion,  or  any  other  purely  objective 
reality  in  the  abstract.    A  man  may  be  considered  in 
the  abstract  in  his  subjective  intellectual  capacity, 
but  not  in  his  objective  animal  capacity.     A  lion, 
also,  may  be  treated  abstractly  in  art,  for  art  always 
contains  the  subjective  element;  and,  moreover,  art 
and   metaphysics   are  two  very  different  subjects. 
Everything  created  by  man,  if  it  be  only  a  rude 
boundary  mark,  contains  this  union  of  the  subjec- 


1 


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A    CRITIQUE  ON  HERBERT  SPENCER, 


IS 


tive  and  objective,  which  distinguishes  it  in  kind 
from  the  purely  natural.  Man  is  at  once  his  own 
object  and  subject.  **  The  great  first  cause  "  might 
be  defined  as  infinite  subjectivity. 

The  English  and  Scotch  schools  of  philosophy 
have  long  been  in  opposition  in  regard  to  the  reality 
of  the  external  world.  This  time-honorea  discus- 
sion may  have  borne  its  fruit  in  the  German  philos- 
ophy of  reconciliation,  but  it  has  always  seemed  to 
me  a  needless  form  of  inquiry.  What  difference 
does  it  make,  so  long  as  we  are  obliged  to  deal  with 
the  external  world  as  a  reality,  whether  in  itself  it  is 
real  or  imaginary  ?  The  true  question  ought  to  be. 
What  do  we  know  of  matter,  and  what  do  we  know 
of  mind,  as  distinguished  from  it  ?  In  Plato's  time 
more  was  probably  known  about  mind  than  matter, 
but  Aristotle  soon  after  gave  a  powerful  impetus  to 
the  investigation  of  physical  causes.  The  truth 
would  seem  to  be  that  in  the  beginning  men  knew 
nothing  of  either,  but  that  we  are  gradually  finding 
out  the  quality  and  attributes  of  both.  All  the 
physical  sciences  are  exemplifications  of  matter,  and 
help  to  instruct  us  what  it  is  in  itself.  Much  has 
been  accomplished  in  this  direction,  and  much  still 
remains  to  be  done.  In  like  manner  the  whole 
science  of  mathematics,  as  well  as  metaphysics  and 
ethics,  are  illustrative  of  mind,  and  instruct  us  con- 
cerning its  true  nature.  We  might  even  assert  that 
he  who  is  not  capable  of  perceiving  that  mind  is  a 
reality  as  much  as  the  ground  under  his  feet,  is  not 
fitted  for  the  study  of  metaphysics.  The  philoso- 
pher who  stated  that  mind  and   matter  are  sepa- 


i6 


SPACE  AND    TIME, 


rated  by  the  whole  diameter  of  being,  was  right  in 
one  sense,  but  does  not  seem  to  have  realized  that 
they  are  perpetually  in  contact,  and  often  so  closely 
united  that  many  well  educated  persons  are  unable 
to  think  of  them  separately. 

The  novelty  of  Spencer's  philosophy  is  his  intro- 
duction of  Darwinian  evolution  as  an  explanation  of 
the  growth  and  development  of  intellectual  life. 
This  has  its  value,  and  there  are  portions  of  his 
work  on  psychology  which  no  living  writer  on  the 
subject  can  afford  to  disregard ;  but  his  attempt  in 
this  direction  also  fails  of  completeness  because  he 
passes  over  the  origin  of  consciousness.  That 
marks  a  barrier  between  man  and  the  brute,  which 
no  scheme  of  physical  evolution  can  explain;  for 
physical  evolution  is  not  in  any  manner  required 
for  it.  The  Darwinian  theory  serves  very  well  as  a 
physical  explanation  of  the  origin  of  mankind,  but 
it  makes  his  intellectual  development  all  the  more 
diflficult  to  understand.  The  origin  of  consciousness 
probably  coincided  with  the  origin  of  language,  for 
one  necessitates  the  other;  and  if  the  intellectual 
development  of  the  lower  animals  coincided  with 
their  physical  development,  we  should  expect  to 
find  more  highly  developed  faculties  in  the  family 
of  apes  than  among  dogs  and  elephants;  but  the 
reverse  of  this  would  seem  to  be  the  case.  Would 
we  not  also  be  justified  in  expecting  a  higher  degree 
of  rudimentary  language  among  apes  than  other 
classes  of  animals  ?  No  evidence  has  been  dis- 
covered, however,  to  prove  that  there  is  any  further 
communication  between  apes  than  between  a  hen 


A    CRITIQUE  ON  HERBeW  SPENCER, 


17 


and  her  chickens.  The  cries  of  animals  are  all  inter- 
jections, and  we  have  obtained  no  testimony  as  yet 
to  show  that  any  animal  makes  use  of  a  definite 
sound  with  reference  to  a  particular  object;  which, 
after  all,  is  what  constitutes  language.  This  is  the 
weak  side  of  the  Darwinian  theory,  and  its  advocates 
in  England  and  America  try  to  avoid  it  as  much  as 
possible.  Even  if  the  Darwinians  succeed  in  bridg- 
ing this  chasm  at  a  future  time,  the  transition  from 
inorganic  to  organic  matter  will  still  remain  to  be 
explained.  If  we  even  suppose  that  the  tendency 
to  language  and  self-consciousness  was  involved  in 
the  nerve-cells  of  the  very  lowest  organism,  by  what 
means  or  power  did  those  nerve-cells  originally  come 
to  exist  ?  This  we  do  not  know,  nor  is  it  likely  that 
we  shall  ever  discover  it,  so  long  as  we  are  mortal 
men,  but  it  is  a  metaphysical  fact  of  the  highest 
importance  that  no  student  of  philosophy  can  safely 
disregard.  The  most  elaborate  schemes,  the  most 
ingenious  system  of  thought,  will  ultimately  come 
to  nothing  unless  this  element  be  included.  The 
mathematician  is  constantly  obliged  to  deal  with 
the  infinite  and  the  indeterminate,  although  he  can 
have  but  a  faint  conception  of  the  significance  of 
either.  So,  likewise,  the  philosopher  is  obliged  to 
deal  with  existence  in  its  twofold  form,  animate 
and  inanimate,  and  make  use  of  both  as  factors  in 
his  reasoning,  although  they  still  remain  to  him  in- 
comprehensible. They  are  difficult  factors  to  deal 
with,  and  make  the  subject  more  difficult  to  under- 
stand, but  it  will  not  do  to  shun  them  or  evade  the 
conclusions  which  they  force  upon  us. 


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